Against Defining Creativity

4 days ago
11 min read

(1) Yanni Ratajczyk

(1) University of Rijeka - yanni.ratajczyk@uniri.hr (ORCID)

Abstract:

Philosophers have attempted to define creativity in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. From Kant to contemporary cognitive scientists, creative acts are often characterized as “valuable novelty.” But what happens when creativity takes a dark turn—when novelty emerges in the service of immoral aims? This article explores the philosophical responses to this paradox, often involving refinements or revisions of the definition of creativity. However, it argues that the paradox may be better addressed not by redefining creativity, but by rethinking philosophy’s deep-seated impulse to define broad concepts like creativity in the first place. Instead, it proposes a phenomenological methodology focused on exploring individual cases of creativity.

Funding: YUFE4Postdocs Grant (Grant ID 101081327)

The Value Condition and the Value Paradox

Most philosophical and psychological accounts define creativity as valuable novelty (see, e.g., Boden, 1990; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Gaut, 2010; for an overview, see Gaut & Kieran, 2018). The novelty condition refers back to the original sense of the Latin creare—to bring something into being. The value condition is often traced back to Immanuel Kant (1790), who introduced it to distinguish the work of genius from mere original nonsense. Today, it remains widely accepted that creativity must be valuable in one way or another—whether it represents a step in personal development, a surprising innovation within a specific field, or a historically transformative invention. Accordingly, the value condition is often defined in terms of usefulness, effectiveness, or appropriateness in psychology (see Runco & Jaegher, 2012) However, there is at least one category of creative acts that complcates this value condition. Some acts are undeniably novel and effective—yet also morally abhorrent. Consider the terrorist attacks of 9/11: strategically innovative and devastatingly effective. Or consider psychopaths who devise inventive methods to deceive and manipulate others. These are instances of what scholars call dark creativity: cases that appear highly creative (in the sense that they are innovative, surpising and effective) but are not the kind of acts we would want to describe as valuable.

This creates a paradox for the idea of creativity as valuable novelty, to which philosophers have responded in various ways. David Novitz (2003) argued that destructiveness and creativity are mutually exclusive, concluding that dark creativity does not truly exist. This conceptual solution, however, has found little support. Berys Gaut proposed a more moderate view. He argued that dark creativity—such as innovative terrorism or inventive torture techniques—can be “good of its kind,” but not “good, period” (2018, p. 128). This preserves the value condition while allowing that some creative acts may be valuable within their domain yet lack value in a broader moral sense.A more radical response comes from Hills and Bird, who reject the value condition entirely. According to them, creativity need not be valuable even within its own domain. They cite the example of a (hypothetical) torture device that is ineffective because it kills too quickly, and the historical example of Arseny Avraamov’s avant-garde art, which they see as a creative dead end (2018, p. 99). They treat these examples as products of creativity, that are, however, not even good of their kind [1].

The Urge to Define

All three of the abovementioned responses to the dark creativity paradox share a deeper assumption: that philosophy must define creativity in a single, unified way that captures all its instances. I think this approach is mistaken. Creativity is an umbrella term that refers to a diverse and ever-growing range of examples—from ordinary, everyday creativity to radical innovation—emerging in contexts ranging from home-cooking and classrooms excercises to research in supramolecular chemistry [2].

Rather than attempting to construct a single theoretical definition that connects these heterogeneous cases, I suggest that we adopt a phenomenological approach. This would allow us to explore the nuances of individual and significantly different examples, rather than bringing them all under some abstact generalizations.

I am aware that to some, this might sound anti-philosophical but other have proposed similar suggestions. Sophie Grace Chappell advocates a similar approach in her 2022 monograph Epiphanies, where she deliberately avoids giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept. Instead, she provides an open-ended list of nine typical features of epiphanies and classifies it as a focal case concept—a concept that comprises paradigmatic examples that satisfy all the nine characteristics but also other cases that hardly satisfy half of them but that we still want to call epiphanies. Chappell reminds us how this hardly posing a problem for studying epiphanies:

There are no non-stipulative necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s being a mountain, either, and the category of the mountainous typically fades out around its edges into literally small-scale phenomena. That does not stop the geologist from studying mountains, nor the alpinist from climbing then. (2022, 9)

Creativity, like epiphanies and mountains, is a concept of this kind. It encompasses so many different kinds and degrees of creativity: the child who uses multiple colored pencils to create multicolored drawings, the musician who combines diverse traditions in impressive ways [3], the manager who radically transforms team dynamics by redesigning the office, and so on, and so on.

In Epiphanies, Chappell promotes a phenomenological methodology and emphasizes the value of phenomenological argumentation in philosophy. A philosopher offers a phenomenological argument when he/she/they describes a phenomenon in rich detail—or better yet, when they show it through literature, testimony, or lived experience. The goal is not to offer a deductive argument in which a conclusion follows logically from strict premises, but to be sincere, accurate, and significant (2022, p. 115).

This approach is equally valuable in philosophical research. Philosophy is not only about the “mathematical virtues of rigor, clarity, and precision,” as Cassam argues (2023, p. 1). It also benefits from exploring examples in order to uncover differences and particularities—rather than abstracting away from them in search of ever-more general theoretical commonalities.

One Last Example: Climate Activism

Let us now consider an ambiguous case of creativity—one whose nature we can explore phenomenologically. Recall how on October 13, 2022, activists from Just Stop Oil protested the UK’s fossil fuel policy by throwing tomato soup at Van Gogh’s iconic painting Sunflowers:

There were gasps, roars and a shout of “Oh my gosh!” in room 43 of the gallery as two young supporters of the climate protest group threw the liquid over the painting, which is protected by glass, just after 11am (…) “What is worth more, art or life?” said one of the activists, Phoebe Plummer, 21, from London. She was accompanied by 20-year-old Anna Holland, from Newcastle. “Is it worth more than food? More than justice? Are you more concerned about the protection of a painting or the protection of our planet and people? The protest sparked mixed reactions and plenty of anger. Sophie Wright, 43, from Surrey, initially condemned the action but changed her mind when she learned the painting was unlikely to have been permanently damaged. “I support the cause and by the looks of it they are considered protests, with a purpose of raising awareness and shocking [people],” she said. “So long as they don’t hurt people or put people in danger, then I support them. “But a witness, who declined to give his name, said he could understand their cause but worried about targeting “a beautiful piece of art, which is the best of humanity”. He added: “They may be trying to get people to think about the issues but all they end up doing is getting people really annoyed and angry. “The typical unthinking individual who doesn’t think about the big issues of the planet is not the kind of person who walks around the National Gallery.” Alienating people from their cause was a concern, said Alex De Koning, a Just Stop Oil spokesperson (…) “But this is not The X Factor,” he added. “We are not trying to make friends here, we are trying to make change, and unfortunately this is the way that change happens.” (Gayle, 2022)

This example does not offer a definition of creativity, but it does provide insight into a specific use of it. `It offers real-life, phenomenologically-rich material for asking and debating philosophical questions about creativity. Such a discussion could sound like follows:

To what extent is this act valuable? How does such a morally ambigious example compare to the abovementioned cases of dark creativity, such as creative but violent acts of terrorism?
Doesn’t this example show how creativity is often transgressive – challenging normsand practices, such as the established ways of activism?
Might this be, like other instances of dark creativity, an atypical case of creativity, where its value is contested unlike typical creativity, which is clearly valuable? But then again, isn't it typical for creativity to take atypical forms, precisely because it challenges standards?

Sometimes, what philosophy needs is not generality, but complexity. This does not imply a loss of understanding, but rather a deepening of our grasp, The rich and multifaceted spectrum that is creativity is best served by such an approach—even when it involves forms of creativity that are uncanny or make us uncomfortable.

Footnotes

In this paper, I examine the underlying assumption shared by the three approaches discussed above. Due to space constraints, I will not delve further into the validity of their respective arguments. Let me simply state here that I find the arguments put forward by Novitz and by Hills and Bird deeply flawed. Novitz’s view seems out of touch with reality, while Hills and Bird’s position is problematic because one of their central examples (Avraamov) is based on a highly subjective aesthetic judgment—one that is contradicted by other art-historical sources (see Monoskop, 2023; Smirnov, 2013).
In this article, I focus mainly on the value aspect of creativity. My concern—that philosophers tend to insist on preserving a single, unified concept that covers all instances of creativity—also applies to the novelty dimension.
I’m thinking, for example, of the Brussels-based band STUFF., who integrated turntable scratching into their eclectic jazz music.

References

Boden, M. A. (2004). The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. (Original work published 1990)
Cassam, Q. (2023). Philosophical virtues. Metaphilosophy, 54(2–3), 195–207.
Chappell, S. G. (2022). Epiphanies: An Ethics of Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2013). Creativity: The Psychology of Discovery and Invention. New York, HarperCollins Publishers. (Original work published 1996)
Gaut, B, Kieran, M. (2018) Philosophising about creativity. In B. Gaut, and M. Kieran, (Eds.), Creativity and Philosophy (pp. 1-22). New York: Routledge.
Gaut, B. (2010). The Philosophy of Creativity. Philosophy Compass, 12(5), 1034–1046.
Gaut, B. (2018). The Value of Creativity. In B. Gaut, M. Kieran (Eds.), Creativity and Philosophy (pp. 127-144). New York: Routledge.
Gayle, D. (2022, October 14). Just Stop Oil activists throw soup at Van Gogh’s Sunflowers. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/oct/14/just-stop-oil-activists-throw-soup-at-van-goghs-sunflowers
Hills, A., Bird, A. (2018). Creativity Without Value. In B. Gaut, M. Keiran (ds.). Creativity and Philosophy (pp. 95-107). New York: Routledge.
Kant, I. (2001). Critique of the Power of Judgment. (P Guyer, E Matthews, Trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press
Monoskop. (n.d.). Arseny Avraamov. In Monoskop.. Retrieved August 3, 2023, from https://monoskop.org/Arseny_Avraamov
Novitz, D. (2003). Explanations of Creativity. In B. Gaut and P. Livingston (Eds.). The Creation of Art: New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics (pp. 174-191), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Runco, M. A., Jaeger, G. J. (2012). The Standard Definition of Creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 24(1), 92-96.
Smirnov, A. (2013). Sound in Z: Experiments in Sound and Electronic Music in Early 20th-century Russia. London: Koenig Books.

Comment 1

First of all, lovely title! From the very beginning, it offers an engaging and provocative framing. The theme and aim of the paper are fascinating and relevant. As a play researcher – also invested in play philosophy – it resonates vividly with both current and historic discussion in that field. Overall, the paper makes a compelling case for resisting unified conceptualisations – and philosophy’s urge to move towards shared/singular concepts; however, it would also benefit from more elaboration, more conceptual connections, and more discussion or reflection on the implications of such a – radical – endeavor.

Nonetheless, the paper offers a provocative and engaging approach to creativity and dark creativity and is thus of great relevance to the journal and its ethos.

The abstract is precise and problematizing. I very much find interest in the aim of rethinking philosophy’s definition and naming impulses that necessarily redefine concepts (creativity) themselves.

The introduction provides a compelling case for creativity and dark creativity, as well as for scholarly discussions on the topic. With the journal’s title and ethos in mind, this appears to be a highly relevant and provocative piece that could expand our approaches to creativity across fields.

Though I do not consider myself a creativity researcher, I find the following slightly provocative (in a good way, though): “All three of the abovementioned responses to the dark creativity paradox share a deeper assumption: that philosophy must define creativity in a single, unified way that captures all its instances. I think this approach is mistaken. Creativity is an umbrella term that refers to a diverse and ever-growing range of examples—from ordinary, everyday creativity to radical innovation—emerging in contexts ranging from home-cooking and classrooms excercises to research in supramolecular chemistry.” I believe that current scholarship of creativity is more and more diverse, and also that we often see a distinction between small and big C creativity, where the examples of home-cooking and classrooms might relate to the small C and ground-breaking research as a big C. It could be read as a straw man argument, and though I absolutely sympathise with the author’s aim and reasoning, a slightly more in-depth explanation and critique would be relevant.

On another note, it reminds me quite a lot of the language philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin, and especially the approach to centrifugal and centripetal forces in language, where we see tendencies and urges to move towards unifying definitions and concepts that inherently limit language and thought. For Bakhtin, an equilibrium between conceptual/linguistic structure and anti-structure is meaningful, as language here still mediates thought and expression among diverse people, though not in a closed or limited way.

In the last part of the text – One Last Example – a climate protest action is provided as an example. Afterwards, the author offers different questions to make us ponder and wonder about creativity and its interplay with value, transgression, dark creativity, and more. The paper would benefit from a more in-depth discussion of how this example displays the micro-perspective on creativity, how it aids us in moving away from grand conceptualisations, and, in other words, supports the reader in making those connections. Moreover, turning back to the discussion of creativity vs. dark creativity, among other things, would strengthen the texts overall arguments. Also, what are the implications of conceptual pluralism? Of rebelling against common knowledge? And emphasizing the particularity and situatedness of knowledge/concepts? These questions may not be answered in one paper, but it would be relevant to critically reflect on the stance and arguments, and on their challenges, in this paper.

Answer to reviewer's comments

I would like to thank the reviewer for this very engaging review. Let me respond to the concern that I may be relying on a straw man by advancing an overly rigid concept of creativity.

The reviewer rightly notes that “current scholarship of creativity is more and more diverse, and also that we often see a distinction between small and big C creativity, where the examples of home-cooking and classrooms might relate to the small C and ground-breaking research as a big C.” However, to my knowledge, this pluralistic understanding is primarily found in psychology, where it has long been recognized that “creativity” is not a single unified phenomenon but rather an umbrella term covering very diverse phenomena. In philosophy, by contrast, this acknowledgment remains limited. What seems to be widely accepted in philosophy is that creativity must involve psychological novelty—that a thought or product must at least be new to the individual in order to count as creative. However, I doubt whether this requirement captures everything we ordinarily and reasonably call creative. In the psychological literature, examples of little-c creativity include for example “creatively arranging family photos in a scrapbook; combining leftover Italian and Chinese food to make a tasty, new fusion of the two cuisines; or coming up with a creative solution to a complex scheduling problem at work” (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009, p. 1). These examples, I think, point more towards an inventiveness concerning materials or tasks at hand, rather than toward the generation of psychologically novel ideas in the strict sense.

In this article, I focus mainly on the value aspect of creativity. My concern—that philosophers tend to insist on preserving a single, unified concept that covers all instances of creativity—also applies to the novelty dimension. The demand that creativity must involve psychological novelty does not sit well with many of the everyday cases (such as the ones mentioned above) we nevertheless want to describe as creative.

My broader claim is that creativity is a domain in which we should prioritize phenomenological diversity over conceptual uniformity. When the reviewer asks about the implications of conceptual pluralism, my answer is not simply that it “rebels against common knowledge,” but rather that it supports a more realistic methodology—one that reflects the diversity of creative phenomena instead of forcing them into a single conceptual mold.

In this regard, I am grateful to the reviewer for introducing Bakhtin, whose work was previously unknown to me. His account of centrifugal and centripetal forces in language seems highly relevant here. In both philosophy and everyday discourse, we constantly struggle to balance conceptual clarity with ontological plurality. I hope this article contributes to that balance by highlighting the importance of a phenomenological methodology in the philosophy of creativity.

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